Category: PKF Avant Edge (Page 1 of 18)

PKF Avant Edge is ISO27001:2022 certified!

We’re thrilled to share that PKF AVANT EDGE has successfully obtained ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certification, as of December 2024.

Over the past year we have committed ourselves to maintain the high standards of Information Security practices surrounding the management of our backend compliance management solution, AwanEdge Manager. In many instances, the question we want to answer was: If we are to give consultation and advisory on cybersecurity and compliance, what can we do to walk the talk? How do we empathise with our customers when we ourselves have not undertaken the journey they go through?

Empathy in our engagements means we don’t simply come to clients with a checklist of requirements of WHAT to do, but rather a deep understanding of HOW they will go through it. We can say, we’ve been there. We know.

Embarking on our Information Security Management System (ISMS) journey, we faced many challenges along the way, especially in getting our backend application and security up to speed. Documentation and procedures could be done, implementing these to the degree required by ISO27001’s stringent standard was another question. Many embark on their ISMS thinking that purchasing a deck of policies and procedures from a website would be sufficient to get them there.

Not even close.

After undergoing the arduous journey ourselves, we can attest to the amount of work ISMS certified companies put in — the late nights of getting everything in order, the changes we have to make in our procedures, the change management program undertaken by the organisation to embed these practices into our people, the implementation of actual security measures and the documentation following this implementation — this gives us the assurance even to ourselves that when we manage our customers’ information, we are managing it right.

This certification represents our pledge to:

  • Protect client data with industry best practices and security measures
  • Maintain the standards of cybersecurity we advocate in our customers
  • Continuously enhance our security frameworks

Special thanks to our dedicated team who made this achievement possible!

Drop us an email at avantedge@pkfmalaysia.com if you want to know more about ISO27001 and how we can assist you in your compliance. Have a great 2025 ahead!


PCI-DSS Scope Understanding: Encryption

Scoping is one of the first and main thing that we do the moment we get engaged, after the customary celebratory drinks. In all projects, scope is always key, moreso in auditing and consulting, in standards compliance, be it PCI, ISMS, NIST 800s, CSA or all the other compliances we end up doing. Without scope there is nothing. Or there is everything, if you are looking at it from the customer’s viewpoint. If boundaries are not set, then everything is in open season. Everything needs to be tested, prodded, penetrated, reviewed. While this is all good and all, projects are all bounded by cost, time and quality. Scope determines this.

In PCI, scoping became such a tremendously huge issue that the council deem it necessary to publish an entire supplemetary document called “Guidance for PCI DSS Scoping and Network Segmentation” back in December 2016. Now, here is a trivia for you, from someone who has been doing PCI for donkey years. Did you know that this isn’t even the first attempt at sorting out scope for PCI-DSS?

Back in 2012, there was a group Open Scoping Framework Group that published the extremely useful Open PCI-DSS Scoping Toolkit that we used for many years as guidance before the council amalgamated the information there into formal documentation. This was our go-to bible and a shout out to those brilliant folks at http://www.itrevolution.com for providing it, many of its original concepts retained when PCI council released their formal documentation on scope and eventually within the standards itself. YES, scoping is finally in the iteration of v4 and v4.0.1 for PCI-DSS in the first few pages, so that people will not get angry anymore.

Or will they?

We’re seeing a phenomenon more and more in the industry of what we term as scope creep. Ok fine, that’s not our word. It’s been in existence since the fall of Adam. Anyway, in PCI context, for no apparent reason some of our customers come back to us and state their consultants, or even QSAs insists on scope being included — for NO REASON except that it is MANDATORY for PCI-DSS. Now, I don’t want to say we have no skin in the game, but this is where I often end up arguing with even the QSAs we partner with. I tell them, “Look, our first job here is to help our customers. We minimize or optimize scope for them, reducing it to the most consumable portion possible, and if they want to do anything extra, let them decide on it. We’re not here to upsell Penetration testing. Or segmentation testing. Or Risk Assessment. Or ASV. Or Policies and Procedures. Or SIEM. Or SOC. Or Logging. Or a basket of guavas and durians.” Dang it, we are here to do one thing: get you PCI compliant and move on with our lives.

The trend we see now is that everything seems to be piled up to our clients to do this and to do that. In the words of one extremely frustrated customer: “Everytime we talk to this *** (name redacted), it seems they are trying to sell us something and getting something out of us, like we are some kind of golden goose.”

Now, obviously, if you are a QSA company and doing that:- STOP IT. Stop it. It’s not only naughty and bring disrepute to your other brethren in the industry, it’s frowned upon and considered against your QSA code! Look at the article here.

Now PCI scoping itself deserves a whole new series of articles but I just want to zoom down to a particular scoping scenario that we recently encountered. It’s in a merchant environment.

Now many of our merchants have either or both of these scopes: Card terminal to process card present at the stores and E-Commerce site. There is one particular customer with card terminal POI (point of interaction), or traditionally known as EDCs (Electronic Data capture). Basically this is where the customer comes, take out the physical card and dip/wave it to this device at the location of the stores. So yes, PCI is required for the merchant for the very fact that the stores have these devices that interact with cards. Now what happens after this?

Most EDCs have SIM based connectivity now, and it goes straight to the acquirer using ISO8583 messages. These are already encrypted on the terminal itself and routes through the telco network to the bank/acquirer for further processing. Other ways are through the store network, routing back to the headquarters and then out to the acquirer. There are reasons why this happens, of course, one would be the aggregation of stores to HQ allows more visibility on the transactions and analysis of traffic. The thing here is, the terminal messages are encrypted by the terminals, that the merchants do not have any access to the keys for decryption. This is important.

Now, what happened was that some QSAs have taken into their mind that because the traffic is routed through the HQ environment, the HQ gets pulled into scope. And therefore , this particular traffic must be properly segmented and then segmentation PT needs to be performed. This could potentially lead to a lot of issues, especially if your HQ environment is populated with a lot of different segments – it could constitute multiple, tiring, tedious testing by the merchant team….or it could constitute a profitable service done by your ‘service providers’ (Again, if these service providers happen to be your QSA, you can see where the question of upsell and independence come from).

Now here’s the crux. We hear these merchants telling us, oh, their consultant or QSA say that it’s mandatory for segmentation PT to occur in this HQ environment. The reasoning is that there is card data flowing through it. Regardless whether it is encrypted or not, as long as there is card data, IT IS IN SCOPE. Segmentation PT MUST BE DONE.

But. Is it though?

The whole point of segmentation PT is that it demarcates out of scope to in-scope. By insisting to have segmentation PT done, is to concede that there is an IN-SCOPE segment or environment in the HQ. The smug QSA nods, as he sagely says, “Well, as QSAs, we are the judge, jury and executioner. I say there is an in scope, regardless of encryption.”

So, we look at the PCI SSC and the standards, and let’s see. QSAs will point to page 14 of PCI-DSS v4.0 standards under “Encrypted Cardholder Data and Impact on PCI DSS Scope”.

Encryption alone is generally insufficient to render the cardholder data out of scope for PCI DSS and does not remove the need for PCI DSS in that environment.

PCI-DSS v4.0.1 by a SMILING QSA RUBBING PALMS TOGETHER

Let’s read further this wonderful excerpt:

The entity’s environment is still in scope for PCI DSS due to the presence of cardholder data. For example, for a merchant card-present environment, there is physical access to the payment cards to complete a transaction and
there may also be paper reports or receipts with cardholder data. Similarly, in merchant card-not-present environments, such as mailorder/telephone-order and e-commerce, payment card details are provided via channels that need to be evaluated and protected according to PCI DSS.

So far, correct. We agree to this. Exactly like what was mentioned, PCI is in scope. The question here is, will the HQ gets pulled in scope just for transmitting encrypted card data from the POIs?

Let’s look at what causes an environment with card encryption to be in scope (reading further down the paragraph)

a) Systems performing encryption and/or decryption of cardholder data, and systems performing key management functions,

b) Encrypted cardholder data that is not isolated from the encryption and decryption and key management processes,

c) Encrypted cardholder data that is present on a system or media that also contains the decryption key,

d) Encrypted cardholder data that is present in the same environment as the decryption key,

e) Encrypted cardholder data that is accessible to an entity that also has access to the decryption key.

So let’s look at the HQ scope. Does it cover the following 5 criteria for in-scope PCI-DSS dealing with encrypted card data? There is no decryption or encryption process done. The encrypted cardholder data is isolated from the key management processes. The merchant has no access or anything to do with the decryption key.

So now you see the drift. Moving down the paragraph, we find noted that when an entity receives and/or stores only data encrypted by another entity, and where they do not have the ability to decrypt the data, they may be able to consider the encrypted data out of scope if certain conditions are met. This is because responsibility for the data generally remains with the entity, or entities, with the ability to decrypt the data or impact the security of the
encrypted data.

In other words: Encrypted cardholder data (CHD) is out of scope if the entity being assessed for PCI cannot decrypt the encrypted card data.

So now back to the question, if this is so, then why does the merchant still need PCI? Well, because it’s already provisioned above: For example, for a merchant card-present environment, there is physical access to the payment cards to complete a transaction and there may also be paper reports or receipts with cardholder data.

So therefore, stores are always in scope. The question we have here is, if the HQ or any other areas are pulled in scope simply for transmitting encrypted CHD as a passthrough to the acquirer. In many way, this is similar to why PCI considered telco lines as out of scope. They simply provide the highway where all these encrypted messages travel on.

Now, of course, the QSA is right about one thing. They do have the final say, because they can still insist on customers doing the segment PT even if its not needed by the standard. They can impose their own risk-based requirements. They can insist the clients do a full application pentest or ASV over all IPs not related to PCI. They can insist on clients getting a pink elephant to dance in a tutu in order to pass PCI. It’s up to them. But guess what?

It’s also up to the customer to change or have another opinion on this. There are plenty of QSAs about. And once more, not all QSAs are created equal as explored in our article here.  Here we debunk common myths like whether having a local QSA makes any difference or not (it doesn’t), and whether all QSAs interpret PCI the same way (they don’t) and how important independence and conflict of interest should play a role, especially in scoping and working for the best interest of the customer, and not peddling services.

So, if you want to have a go with us, or at least just get an opinion on your PCI scope, drop a message to pcidss@pkfmalaysia.com and we will get back to you and sort out your scoping questions!


Major Changes of PCI v4

So now as we approach the final throes of PCI-DSS v3.2.1, the remaining 3 weeks is all that is left of this venerable standard before we say farewell once and for all.

PCI-DSS V4.0 is a relative youngster and we are already doing hours of updates with our customers on the things they need to prepare for. Don’t underestimate v4.0! While its not a time to panic, it’s also not a time to just lie back and think that v4.0 is not significant. It is.

Below is a table that provides an insight of the major changes we are facing in v4.0.

Bearing in mind that most of the requirements now start off with keeping policies updated and document roles and responsibilities, the major changes are worth a little bit of focus. In the next series of articles, we will go through each one as thoroughly as we can and try to understand the context in which it exists on.

Let’s start off the one on the top bin. Requirement 3.4.2.

Req. 3.4.2: When using remote-access technologies, technical controls prevent copy and/or relocation of PAN for all personnel, except for those with documented, explicit authorization and a legitimate, defined business need

PCI v4.0

Ok, we have underlined and emphasized a few key points in this statement. Because we feel that is important. Let’s start with what 3.4.2 applies to.

It applies to: Remote Access

It requires: Technical Controls

It must: PREVENT THE COPYING/RELOCATION

Of the subject matter: Full Primary Account Number

In v3.2.1 this was found in section 12.3.10 with slightly different wordings.

Req 12.3.10 For personnel accessing cardholder data via remote-access technologies, prohibit the copying, moving, and storage of cardholder data onto local hard drives and removable electronic media, unless explicitly authorized for a defined business need. Where there is an authorized business need, the usage policies must require the data be protected in accordance with all applicable PCI DSS Requirements.

PCI v3.2.1

I think 4.0, aside from the relocation of the requirement to the more relevant requirement 3 (as opposed to requirement 12, which we call the homeless requirement for any controls that don’t seem to fall into any other earlier requirements), reads better. Firstly, putting it in requirement 3 puts the onus on the reader to consider this as part of protection of storage of account data which is the point of Requirement 3. Furthermore, digging into the sub-requirement, 3.4 section header states: Access to displays of full PAN and ability to copy PAN is restricted.

This is the context of it, where we find the child of this 3.4 section called 3.4.2 and we need to understand it first, before we go out and start shopping for the first DLP system on the market and yell out “WE ARE COMPLIANT!”

3.4 talks about displays of FULL PAN. So we aren’t talking about truncated, or encrypted PAN here. So in theory, if you copy out a truncated PAN or encrypted PAN, you shouldn’t trigger 3.4.2. Its specific to full PAN. While we are at it, we aren’t even talking about cardholder data. A PAN is part of cardholder data, while not all cardholder data is PAN. Like the Hulk is part of the Avengers but not all Avengers are the Hulk. So if you want to copy the cardholder name or expiration date for whatever reasons like data analysis, behavioural prediction, stalking etc…this isn’t the requirement you are looking for.

Perhaps this is a good time to remind ourselves what is Account Data, Card Holder Data and Sensitive Authentication Data (SAD).

The previous v3.2.1 doesn’t actually state ‘technical controls’, which goes to say that if it’s a documentary controls, or a policy control, or something in the Acceptable Use Policy, it can also pass off as compliant. V4.0 removes that ambiguity. Of course, the policy should be there, but technical controls are specific. It has to be technical. It can’t be, oh wait, I have a nice paragraph in section 145.54(d)(i)(iii)(ab)(2.4601) in my information security acceptance document that stated this!

So these technical control(s) must PREVENT copying and relocation. Firstly just to be clear, copy is Ctrl-C and Ctrl-V somewhere else. Relocation is Ctrl-X and Ctrl-V somewhere else. Both has its problem. In copying, we will end up PAN having multiple locations of existence. In relocation, the PAN is moved, and now systems accessing the previous location will throw up an error – causing system integrity and performance issues. Suffice to say, v4.0 demands the prevention of both happening to PAN. Unless you have a need that is:

a) DOCUMENTED

b) EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED (not Implied)

c) LEGITIMATE

d) DEFINED

When a business need is both “documented” and “defined,” it means that the requirement has been both precisely articulated (defined) and recorded in an official capacity (documented). So a list of people with access is needed for the who, why they legitimately need to access/copy/relocate PAN in terms of their business, explicitly authorized by proper authority (not themselves, obviously).

Finally, let’s talk about technical controls. Now, remember, this applies to REMOTE ACCESS. I’ve heard of clients who says, hey no worries, we have logging and monitoring in place for internal users. Or we have web application firewall in place. Or we have cloudflare in place. Or we have a thermonuclear rocket in place to release in case we get attacked. This control already implies ‘remote access’ into the environment. The users have passed the perimeter. It implies they are already trusted personnel, or contractors or service providers with properly authorized REMOTE ACCESS. Also, note that the authorization here is NOT for remote access, it is for the explicit action of copy/relocating PAN. In this case, most people would probably not have a business reason of copying/relocating PAN to their own systems unless for very specific business flow requirements. This means, only very few people in your organization should have this applied to them, under very specific circumstances. An actual real life example would be for an insurance client we have, they had to copy all transaction information, including card details in an encrypted format and put it into a removable media (like a CD-ROM) and then send it over to the Ombudsman for Financial Services as part of a regulatory requirement. That’s pretty specific.

So what passess off as a ‘technical control’? A Technical control may be as simple as to completely prevent copy/paste or cut/paste ability when accessing via remote access. This can be done in RDP or disable clipboard via SSLVPN. While I am not the most expert product specialist in remote access technologies, I can venture to say its fairly common to have these controls inbuilt into the remote access product. So, there may not be a need for DLP in that sense, as the goal here is to prevent the copying and relocation of PAN.

Now that being said, an umbrella disallow of copy and paste may not go well with some suits or C-levels who want to copy stuff to their drive to work while they are in the Bahamas. Of course. You could provide certain granular controls, depending on your VPN product or which part of the network they access. If a granular control cannot be agreed on, then a possible way is to enforce proper control via DLP (Data Loss Prevention) in endpoint protection. Or control access to CDE/PAN via a hardened jump server that has local policy locked down. So the general VPN into company resources may be more lax, but the moment access to PAN is required, 3.4.2 technical controls come in play.

At the end, how you justify your technical controls could be through a myriad of ways. The importance is of course, cost and efficiency. It has to make cost sense and it must not require your users to jump through hoops like a circus monkey.

So there you have it, a break down of 3.4.2. We are hopping into the next one in the next article so stay tuned. If you have any queries on PCI-DSS v4.0 or other related cybersecurity needs, be it SOC1 or 2, ISO27001, ISO20000, NIST or whether Apollo 11 really landed on the moon in 1969, drop us a note at avantedge@pkfmalaysia.com and we will get back to you!

Zero Trust for 2024

As we enter into the new year, lets start off with a topic that most cybersecurity denizens would have heard of and let’s clarify it a little.

Zero Trust.

It seems a good place as any, to start 2024 off with the pessimism that accompanied the end of last year – the spate of cybersecurity attacks in 2023 had given us a taste of what is to come – insurance company – check, social security – check, the app with our vaccination information – check. While breaking down the attacks is meant for another article, what we are approaching now for the coming year is not just more of the same, but much more and more advanced attacks are bound to happen.

While Zero Trust is simply a concept – one of many – to increase resistance to attacks or breach, it’s by no means a silver bullet. There is NO silver bullet to this. We are in a constant siege of information warfare and the constant need to balance the need for sharing and the need for protection. It is as they say; the safest place would be in a cave. But that’s now living, that’s surviving. If you need to go somewhere, you need to fly, you have information with the airlines. If you need to do banking, you have information with the banks. If you need to conduct your daily shopping online, you are entrusting these guys like Lazada et al the information that otherwise you may not likely provide.

So Zero Trust isn’t the fact that you conduct zero transaction, its basically a simple principle: Trust no one, Verify everything. Compare it to the more traditional “trust but verify” approach, which assumed that everything inside an organisation’s network should be trusted, even if we do have verifications of it. Here’s a breakdown of the concept, in hopefully simpler terms.

The Basic Premise: Imagine a company as a fortified castle. In the old days, once you were inside the castle walls, it was assumed you belonged there and could roam freely. At least this is based on the limited studies we have done by binge watching Game of Thrones. All historical facts of the middle ages can be verified through Game of Thrones, including the correct anatomy of a dragon.

Back to the analogy, what if an enemy disguised as a friend managed to get inside? They would potentially have access to everything. Zero Trust Architecture operates on the assumption that threats can exist both outside and inside the walls. Therefore, it verifies everyone’s identity and privileges, no matter where they are, before granting access to the castle’s resources. The 3 keys you can remember can be:

  1. Never Trust, Always Verify: Zero Trust means no implicit trust is granted to assets or user accounts based solely on their physical or network location (i.e., local area networks versus the internet) or based on asset ownership (enterprise or personally owned). Basically, we are saying, I don’t care where you are or who you are, you are not having access to this system until I can verify who you are.
  2. Least Privilege Access: Individuals or systems are given the minimum levels of access — or permissions — needed to perform their tasks. This limits the potential damage from incidents such as breaches or employee mistakes. We see this issue a lot, whereby a C level person insist on having access to everything even if he doesn’t necessarily know how to navigate a system without a mouse. When asked why, they say, well, because I am the boss. No. In Zero Trust, in fact, because you are the boss, you shouldn’t have access into a system that does not require your meddling. Get more sales and let the tech guys do their job!
  3. Micro-Segmentation: The network is broken into smaller zones to maintain separate access for separate parts of the network. If a hacker breaches one segment, they won’t have access to the entire network.

The steps you can follow to implement the concept of Zero Trust:

Identify Sensitive Data: Know where your critical data is stored and who has access to it. You can’t protect everything. Or at least not with the budget you are given, which for most IT groups, usually is slightly more than they allocate to upkeep the company’s cat. So data identification is a must-have. Find out what is the data that you most want to protect and spend your shoe-string budget to protect it!

Verify Identity Rigorously: Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) and identity verification for anyone trying to access resources, especially important resources like logging systems, firewalls, external webservers etc. This could mean something you know (password), something you have (a smartphone or token), or something you are (biometrics). It used to cost a mortgage to implement things like this but over the years, cheaper solutions which are just as good are now available.

Contextual Access: Access decisions should consider the context. For example, accessing sensitive data from a company laptop in the office might be okay, but trying to access the same data from a personal device in a coffee shop might not be. This may not be easy, because now with mobile devices, you are basically accessing top secret information via the same device that you watch the cat playing the piano. Its a nightmare for IT security – but again, this has to have discipline. If you honestly need to access the server from Starbucks , then implement key controls like MFA, VPN, layered security and from a locked-down system.

Inspect and Log Traffic: Continuously monitor and log traffic for suspicious activity. If something unusual is detected, access can be automatically restricted. SOAR and SIEM products have advanced considerably over the years and today we have many solutions that do not require you to sell a kidney to use. This is beneficial as small companies are usually targeted for attacks, especially if these smaller companies services larger companies.

At the end, it all comes down to what are the benefits to adopt this approach.

Enhanced Security: By verifying everything, Zero Trust minimizes the chances of unauthorised access, thereby enhancing overall security. Hopefully. Of course, we may still have those authorised but have malicious intent, which would be much harder to protect from.

Data Protection: Sensitive data is better protected when access is tightly controlled and monitored. This equates to less quarter given to threat players out there.

Adaptability: Zero Trust is not tied to any one technology or platform and can adapt to the changing IT environment and emerging threats.

On the downside, there are still some challenges we need to surmount:

Complexity: Implementing Zero Trust can be complex, requiring changes in technology and culture. It’s not a single product but a security strategy that might involve various tools and technologies. This is not just a technical challenge as well, but a process and cultural change that may take time to adapt to.

User Experience: If not implemented thoughtfully, Zero Trust can lead to a cumbersome user experience with repeated authentication requests and restricted access. This is a problem we see a lot, especially in finance and insurance – user experience is key – but efficiency and security are like oil and water. Eternal enemies. Vader and Skywalker. Lex and Supes. United and Liverpool. Pineapple and Pizza.

Continuous Monitoring: Zero Trust requires continuous monitoring and adjustment of security policies and systems, which can be resource-intensive. We’ve seen implementation of SIEM and SOAR products which are basically producing so many alerts and alarms that it makes no sense anymore. These all become noise and the effects of monitoring is diluted.

In summary, an era where cyber threats are increasingly sophisticated and insiders can pose as much of a threat as external attackers, Zero Trust Architecture offers a robust framework for protecting an organisation’s critical assets. It’s about making our security proactive rather than reactive and ensuring that the right people have the right access at the right times, and under the right conditions. It’s culturally difficult, especially in Malaysia, where I will have to admit, our innate trust of people and our sense of bringing up means we always almost would open the door for the guy behind us to walk in, especially if he is dressed like the boss. We hardly would turn around and ask, “Who are you?” because we are such nice people in this country.

But, adopt we must. For any organisation looking to bolster its cybersecurity posture, Zero Trust isn’t just an option; it’s becoming a necessity. In PKF we have several services and products promoting Zero Trust – contact us at avantedge@pkfmalaysia.com and find out more. Happy New Year!

Trends for InfoSec moving into 2023

When I was a kid, I used to watch this show called Beyond 2000 and imagined, if I lived to year 2000, I would be seeing flying cars and teleportation and space travel. Later on, I had to temper my expectation but was still filled with optimism when October 21, 2015 rolled around, at least, we would have a hoverboard to fool around with. At least.

We are now in 2023. No flying cars. No hoverboards or hovertrains and no flux capacitors to go back in time to make gambling bets. We do have a lot of information security issues, though, and while not really sexy enough to make a Hollywood movie around it, it’s still giving us enough to do as we ride into this new year on what trends we think may impact us moving forward.

To understand why information security has become increasingly important in recent years, we look at the sheer amount of sensitive information being stored and transmitted electronically, and shared in our everyday interaction. We share and give information without us knowing it, even. Everytime we browse the net, everytime we hover our mouse over a product, everytime we use our credit card to get your coffee or pay for Karaoke session, everytime we check our location on Waze:- the vast array of information and data is being transmitted and curated carefully by organisations intent on peering into our lives to make it “better”.

As information continues to grow, increasing amount of incidents follow. Some of the more high profile ones include

a) SingHealth – In July 2018, one of Singapore’s largest healthcare group, SingHealth, suffered a data breach where personal information of 1.5 million patients, including Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, was stolen. How was this achieved? The attackers had gained unauthorized access to the network and exfiltrated the data through a sophisticated method, which involved using a “well-planned and carefully orchestrated cyber attack” and a “spear-phishing” campaign in which the attackers sent targeted emails to specific individuals within the organization to gain access to the network. No matter how much investments we make in technology, the weakest link still remain the humans around it, especially those interested to click on links depicting a cat playing the piano furiously.

b) India’s National Payment Corporation of India (NPCI) – In January 2021, the NPCI, the company that manages India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) system, which enables inter-bank transactions, experienced a data breach. The breach was caused by a vulnerability in the UPI system that was exploited by hackers, who then used the stolen data to make fraudulent transactions. The incident resulted in a temporary suspension of the UPI system, causing inconvenience to millions of users.

c) Garmin – Back in 2021, Garmin, a leading provider of GPS navigation and fitness tracking devices, was targeted by a ransomware attack. The attackers used a variant of ransomware called WastedLocker, which encrypted the company’s data and demanded a ransom payment. The attack caused the company to shut down its operations, leading to widespread service disruptions.

d) SolarWinds – Ah, this was probably one of the largest profile cases of data breach in recent memory. It was discovered that a sophisticated cyber attack had breached multiple government agencies and private companies, including SolarWinds, that runs IT management software. The attackers used a vulnerability in SolarWinds’ software to gain access to the networks of the companies and organizations that used it, and used those accesses to steal sensitive information. The incident was attributed to a Russian cyber espionage group known as APT29 or “Cozy Bear”.

Many more information security issues will continue to occur well into this year and the next and the next. One of the burning question is how companies can keep up with this movement, and how we can remain vigilant.

One trend that is likely to continue into this year is the establishment of cloud computing. While previously we had AWS/Azure, we now see a larger array and options for cloud providers. Within the cloud itself, services being offered are replacing traditional needs for separate security functions like logging systems, authentication systems etc. As more and more organizations move their data and applications to the cloud, it will become increasingly important to ensure that this data is protected against unauthorized access and breaches. This will require more stringent security measures to improve encryption, multi-factor authentication, and continuous monitoring of cloud environments.

One of the more interesting ideas that has floated around is the use of blockchain technology for security. Blockchain is a decentralized, distributed ledger that can be used to securely store and transmit sensitive information. This can help in the C,I,A triad of security. Encryption for confidentiality, immutability in blockchain records to ensure integrity; decentralization of data to remove single points of failure to ensure availability. There could be many more uses, but it still remains an abstract for many organisations looking at this for their information technology. As such for basic implementation, this may be useful for applications such as supply chain management, where multiple parties need to share information in a secure and transparent way.

Another growing trend, as always, is the need for strong cybersecurity workforce. As the number of cyber threats continues to grow, it will be increasingly important to have a workforce that is trained and equipped to deal with these threats. This will require organizations to invest in employee training and development, as well as to recruit and retain highly skilled cybersecurity professionals. Professional training, a big industry in Malaysia, will continue to play a key role in enabling people to carry out their vital tasks within the information security landscape.

Another abstract trend we often hear, deals with the Internet of Things (IoT) devices. In short, IoT refers to the growing network of physical devices, vehicles, buildings, and other items that are embedded with sensors, software, and connectivity, allowing them to collect and exchange data with each other. The example we always see is that fridge telling us we are running short on milk and placing an order to get milk for us. But IoT is happening whether we like it or not. Healthcare will be heavily dependent on it as information is exchanged with digital systems across nationwide healthcare systems; manufacturing of course is putting more traditional systems onto the network to integrate with automated processing tools; transportation is getting more digitized than ever, car manufacturers now looking not just to hardware but to cloud enablement of software running in cars. Even wearables, fitness apps, smart homes etc are impacting end users in more ways than we can imagine. It’s coming. or it’s here – eitherway, we expect 75 billion devices to be connected over IoT by 2025.

Another trend we like to see more in 2023 is the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning for security. These technologies can be used to detect and respond to cyber threats in real-time, as well as to analyze large amounts of security data to identify patterns and anomalies that may indicate a potential attack. We traditionally have threat intelligence but the time to respond to threats were still lagging behind, dependence on human intervention and decisions. With automated systems, more advanced rules and correlation of multiple information points, actions can be orchestrated through a more meaningful, machine learnt manner as opposed to depending on manual rules and signatures.

While not the most sexy or interesting, where we want to see improvement and a trend to get better, would be to improve and make more effective incident response plans. With the increasing number of cyber threats and attacks, it is critical that organizations have the ability to quickly and effectively respond to security incidents. This will require organizations to have detailed incident response plans in place, as well as to regularly test and update these plans to ensure that they are current and effective.

One trend we want to see more, especially in our accounting and auditing industry, is the adoption of security automation. This will involve the use of software tools and technologies that can automate various security tasks, such as vulnerability management, incident response, and threat intelligence. Implementation of tools such as Ansible has been done in our organisation, providing at least a first layer of understanding configuration and management of systems. With more automation, this will help us to more efficiently and effectively protect and respond against cyber threats.

Finally, some of the things we hardly talk about in information security is how much more integrated infosec needs to be in the field of humanities. A lot of us approach info sec from a technical viewpoint, which is great but perhaps a more effective viewpoint should be from the views from humanities. The humanities can play several roles in information security, including providing a broader understanding of the social and cultural contexts in which security threats occur, assisting with the development of effective communication strategies for raising awareness and educating the public about security risks, and helping to design user-centered security systems that take into account the needs and behaviors of different groups of users. Additionally, the study of ethics in the humanities can be used to inform decision making and policy development in information security. An example would be how implementing more stringent security monitoring may impact the innate need for privacy within employees – where, though the technology is sound and good and the intent is well thought of, organisations may still end up pushing out policies and technology that people will revolt against as opposed to embracing. This is not a field we often think of, but moving forward, it’s worth dwelling on and indeed provides us a more holistic way on how infosec can be part of our lives.

This isn’t so much of our traditional compliance article, but it’s always interesting to try to peer into a crystal ball and see what’s ahead and then at the end of the year see what has been proven more correct or wrong in our trends prediction. Drop us a note at avantedge@pkfmalaysia.com and tell us what you think, or if you require any of our services. Have a great year ahead!

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