Category: IT Security (Page 15 of 15)

PCI DSS and the Problem of Scoping

pci-compliance

I recall in an actual case a few years back when I received a call from a company requesting us to do a certification for PCI for them. So I met them and drew out their PCI plan starting with a gap assessment, remediation and certification audit.

They said they have already done their own gap assessments internally by their ISMS guys. And they will be doing all their remediation on their own and they just needed me to quote for certification audit because “PCI is forcing us to be certified by a third party, which we believe we can do it better than you can”.

There was nothing much to talk to them about, but I did mention that if we find major NC (non compliances, in ISMS speak), we would then use that ‘certification audit’ as our own gap assessment and that we might be required to come back again to verify.

The company truly believed that PCI was a subset of ISMS and they handled it as such.

So we came in for the certification and found out that their entire scope was completely messed up. For instance, there was another out of scope network and systems connecting into their CDE for monitoring. Because card data wasn’t passing through, they marked it as out of scope. Unfortunately, PCI doesn’t see it that way. This would be considered an Non CDE In Scope, and systems within this network will need to be secured as well, and hardened as per PCI. The logic is that if these systems are compromised, there is a path into the CDE that can be exploited.

They made a huge fuss on this, claiming that they are willing to absorb the risk and that their management signs off on the risk assessment.

ISMS is a best practice/guideline at best – it’s a great marker for security, but PCI is a standard. If you can’t meet it, then you don’t meet it. Of course, there are ways around this particular issue, but they insisted we passed them simply because their management accepted the risk.

Here’s another idea: PCI-DSS generally doesn’t really care about your business. It’s not about you. It’s about card data. Visa/Mastercard and the Jedi PCI council are not concerned about your business – they are concerned about the confidentiality and integrity of card data. That’s why you will not find any BCM or DRP requirement in PCI. RTO and RPO? Pfft. They don’t care. Your business can go down for 10 weeks but as long as card data is safe, it’s good.

And that’s why, scoping is HUGELY important. Many people might think that a gap assessment is a waste of time. It is, if it’s done incorrectly. I recently witnessed a ‘gap assessment’ report that was a complete mess. It just detailed the PCI twelve requirements and in each requirement gave an overview of the company’s controls and what they should be doing: ripped off almost verbatim from the actual standard itself. That can be downloaded for free.

A gap assessment needs to bring you from one place to another and needs to provide these:

a) A clear understanding of your scope, including a writeup on your network, and processes that have been assessed. It should also be clear what is out of scope. This initial scope usually is not set in stone as remediation would sometimes change what is in scope and what is not in scope. But at least you have something concrete to start with.

b) If possible, an asset register. For PCI. If this is not possible (for many reasons, e.g they have not purchase some assets required for a control), then the asset inventory needs to be prioritised a quickly as possible to see what is scoped and not. Asset should be clear on: Public ips, internal devices, servers, network devices, people involved, desktops, databases etc.

c) Network in scope and out of scope. This is key as companies are required to identify segments scoped out, and do segmentation testing. Also, CDE is clearly marked, NON-CDE IN SCOPE (we call it NCIS) must also be identified. Systems in NCIS could be monitoring system, SIEM, AD etc. Any system that connects to the CDE, but does not store, transmit or process credit card data are considered NCIS. NCIS must be scoped for testing, quarterly scans, hardening and such.

d) Clear roadmap for remediation and recommendations to proceed, specific to the organisation. These ‘gaps’ should all have a corresponding solution(s).

If the gap assessment doesn’t give you any of these, then it’s pretty useless. If it doesn’t move you forward or provide you with the information to move forward, it’s not a gap assessment. It’s an expensive training session.

So back to the first example of a customer. It wasn’t possible for us to certify them no matter how they argued, because simply they were not compliant (there were also many issues that they did not comply, for instance storage of card data in text files and sending via emails).

As a lesson – don’t neglect the proper scoping. It’s hard work, but as I always say: Start wrongly, do wrongly, finish wrongly. And that’s 6 – 8 months down the drain, with thousands of ringgit gone in investing, and job on the line. The second example is pertinent also. There is always a chance to OVERSCOPE as there is to UNDERscope.

An overscoping example would be to purchase all sort of snazzy security systems worth thousands of ringgit only to find that these were not needed, or that current controls were sufficient. It’s nice to have – but most of our customers, no matter how big they are, always have a trigger on the budget and cost optimisation is the topmost in their priority.

If you want us to help you in your PCI-DSS scoping, drop us a note at avantedge@pkfmalaysia.com and we can get you started with the initial understanding straight away!

PCI-DSS v3.2 is officially published

pci-compliance

After some back and forth on the draft versions, PCI v3.2 is now officially published. You can go ahead and download it here, and click on the nice little link saying 3.2 and agree to all sorts of terms and agreements nobody ever reads about.

Anyway, a little bit of background on this release. Usually, versions for PCI are released in the later stages of the year in November. In fact, even I mentioned this to a few clients that version updates were done in November, until PCI recently announced that v3.2 is to be released in March/April timeline due to a few factors as described in this article. So yeah, now I need to admit I was bamboozled. PA-DSS v3.2 is likewise to be released sometime in May or June.

So here’s how it works: 3.2 is now officially effective. PCI v3.1 will be retired end of October 2016 (basically to allow everyone to sort of complete the v3.1 if you are already in the final stage of completing it). So all assessments/audit that occurs AFTER October will be version 3.2. This is important to note, because if any gap assessments begin now, and has a timeline to complete AFTER October, you want to use 3.2. For ongoing projects, it is best we scurry and get it all done before October! Chop chop!

There is a bunch of ‘best practices’ that will become requirements by February 2018. Other dates you need to be aware of:

a) June 30, 2016 – for companies not migrated yet out of SSL/early TLS, you will need to have a secure service offering (meaning an alternative service utilising TLS.1.1 and above. I will go out on a limb here and suggest to use TLS1.2 knowing how volatile PCI guys are in changing stuff).

b) June 30, 2018 – SSL/early TLS becomes extinct as far as PCI is concerned. No more mitigation plan! The exception is on POS terminals that has no known exploits.

c) January 31, 2018 – This is the deadline where new requirements graduate from being ‘best practices’ to ‘mandatory requirements’.

OK, now that’s out of the way, here’s a snapshot on the main stuff of v3.2 and what we are facing:

a) New Appendix A3 covers the Designated Entities Supplemental Validation. This basically means that if any acquirer or VISA/Master deems that a service provider needs to go through ADDITIONAL requirements on top of the torture they have endured for PCI, they can. These victims could include companies making ridiculous amount of transactions, aggregators or companies that are constantly breached. So PCI has a whole bunch of extra stuff for you to do, mainly to deal with BAU activities, incident response, documentation and logical access controls.

b) Additional cryptographic documentation – Service providers are not going to enjoy this. We will now need to formally document the protocols, key strength, cryptoperiod, key usage for each key and HSM inventory. This should technically be done anyway in your key management procedure document, but now its a requirement. Take a look at NIST SP800-57 for the key concepts to get you started.

c) 8.3 is significant : Multifactor login. Whereby previous versions stated that 2 factor authentication is required for remote access from non-secure networks, now 3.2 shifted this requirement to “all personnel with non-console administrative access, and all personnel with remote access to the CDE”. Wait, what? This means, even if you are accessing an administrative UI or page (non-console) from a secure environment, multi-factor (2 factor is good enough) is required! I think there would be some pushback on this as this requires a fair bit of effort. We have until February 2018 to implement this.

d) Another big one is 11.3.4.1 – segmentation PT now needs to be done every SIX months as opposed to a year. This is not good news for some clients who have segments popping up like acne on a pubescent face. That’s quite a lot of work for them to do and this might give them more cause to think of a completely isolated network just for PCI-DSS with its own link and architecture, as opposed to sharing with multiple not in scope segments. Again, we have some grace period till Feb 2018.

e) New requirement 12.11 is interesting. I have always been an advocate to do constant checks with clients to make sure they are at least practicing PCI. We have this free healthcheck service every quarter for clients who take up our other services and we are checking exactly this: daily log reviews, firewall is clean, new systems are documented and hardened, incidents are responded, proper approval for changes etc. It’s nice to see that our efforts now have something formal tied to them. Feb 2018 is the deadline.

f) Here’s a downer. Appendix A2. We all know there was some sort of escape loop for those who were caught with SSL and early TLS in their applications. They created mitigation documents which may or may not be true. Just saying. Now, if you take this route, this is no longer a free pass for your ASV scans or vulnerability scans. If you have these protocols in place, your mitigation plan must fully address A2.2 requirements. If you are a service provider, take note of A2.3: YOU MUST have a secure service option in place by June 30, 2016! Not 2018. 2018 is when you stop using SSL/early TLS. So this timeline is slightly confusing. Like X-Men:Days of Future Past confusing.

Some main clarifications include:

a) Secure code training now officially needs to be done annually – you won’t want to guess how much push back I get on this when I tell clients it’s annual, and not something that is done when they have the budget for it (which is never).

b) Removing the need to interview developers to ‘demonstrate’ their knowledge – I do programming a bit, but I’ll be foolish to think I can go up against a senior developer who eats, breathes and … lives for coding. How awkward I’ve seen some younger QSAs struggle to do this (determining whether the senior dev guru is good enough), when its obviously not something they even know about. Let auditors audit and let developers code.

c) Finally, note added to Req 8 to say that authentication requirements are not required for cardholder accounts, but only to administrative or operational/support/third party accounts. We have always practiced this anyway but now its clear.

d) More clarifications on addressing vulnerabilities considered ‘high’ or ‘critical’. I am not a big fan of these. I think every vulnerability should eventually be addressed, just prioritised in terms of timing. Even if it’s low or medium, it’s still important to have a mitigating factor to it. There is a reason why it’s a vulnerability and not something you can sweep under the carpet.

e) A good note on pentesting in 11.3.4c – testing now needs to be done by qualified internal or external resource with independence. Again, we already practice this but it’s good that now it’s official.

So, that’s about it. Of course, there’s a fair bit more. I suggest you to poke through the summary of changes first and then go through the documentation itself.

Be aware of those dates! It’s all over the place (June 2016, June 2018, Jan 2018), and who knows these might change in the future. Have a happy compliance.

 

 

 

Advisory on Badlock Vulnerability

badlock

This is a security advisory on the Badlock Bug.

What is Badlock?

Samba is an important component to seamlessly integrate Linux/Unix Servers and Desktops into Active Directory environments. It can function both as a domain controller and as a regular domain member. On April 12th, 2016 Badlock, a crucial security bug in Windows and Samba was disclosed. The security vulnerabilities can be mostly categorized as man-in-the-middle or denial of service attacks.

Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks:

There are several MITM attacks that can be performed against a variety of protocols used by Samba. These would permit execution of arbitrary Samba network calls using the context of the intercepted user. Impact examples of intercepting administrator network traffic:

  • Samba AD server – view or modify secrets within an AD database, including user password hashes, or shutdown critical services.
  • Standard Samba server – modify user permissions on files or directories.

Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks:

Samba services are vulnerable to a denial of service from an attacker with remote network connectivity to the Samba service. Microsoft has addressed this in MS16-047. This vulnerability can be used to login as another user for applications that use the SAMR or LSAD protocol. All versions of Windows are affected.

Who is Vulnerable?

Samba Application running on Linux/Unix Systems

  • 3.6.x,
  • 4.0.x,
  • 4.1.x,
  • 4.2.0-4.2.9,
  • 4.3.0-4.3.6,
  • 4.4.0

Windows

All supported editions of Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows RT 8.1, and Windows 10.

Associated CVEs

Badlock for Samba is referenced by CVE-2016-2118 (SAMR and LSA man in the middle attacks possible) and for Windows by CVE-2016-0128 / MS16-047 (Windows SAM and LSAD Downgrade Vulnerability).

There are additional CVEs related to Badlock. Those are:

  • CVE-2015-5370 (Multiple errors in DCE-RPC code)
  • CVE-2016-2110 (Man in the middle attacks possible with NTLMSSP)
  • CVE-2016-2111 (NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability)
  • CVE-2016-2112 (LDAP client and server don’t enforce integrity)
  • CVE-2016-2113 (Missing TLS certificate validation)
  • CVE-2016-2114 (“server signing = mandatory” not enforced)
  • CVE-2016-2115 (SMB IPC traffic is not integrity protected)

How to check if server is vulnerable?

A server is vulnerable to BADLOCK if:

  • It is running any of the above mentioned versions of SAMBA
  • For vulnerable Windows versions refer the following link:

https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-047

How to fix

For Samba service running on Linux/Unix systems, apply the patches provided by the Samba Team and SerNet for EnterpriseSAMBA / SAMBA+ immediately.

Patched versions are (both the interim and final security release have the patches):

  • 4.2.10 / 4.2.11,
  • 4.3.7 / 4.3.8,
  • 4.4.1 / 4.4.2.

For Windows Installations, refer following link for patch details:

https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-047

 

References and Useful Links

http://badlock.org/

https://www.samba.org/samba/latest_news.html#4.4.2

https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2016-2118.html

https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS16-047

For more information or a vulnerability scan, please contact us at avantedge@pkfmalaysia.com.

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