Category: IT Audit (Page 2 of 13)

ISO27001 Risk Assessment: Threats vs Vulnerabilities

Some of the building blocks in a risk assessment is the identification of threats and vulnerabilities. A lot of times, many people do get mixed up between these two. In the context of ISO27005, a risk is typically defined as the potential that a given threat will exploit the vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets, causing harm to the organisation. So, understanding both threats and vulnerabilities is crucial to effective risk management.

The above table provides a typical understanding of the difference between these two.

Now, let us provide a few examples of threats and vulnerabilities that you may find useful when you are deriving these for your risk assessment.

a) Database Threats and Vulnerabilities

b) Servers Threats and Vulnerabilities

c) Physical Environment Threats and Vulnerabilities

d) Documentation Threats and Vulnerabilities

e) Application Threats and Vulnerabilities

f) HR (Employee) Threats and Vulnerabilities

The above are samples and examples. There could be many many more different threats, categories and vulnerabilities that are identified in the context of your organisation. If you need any assistance, please let us know and drop us a note at avantedge@pkfmalaysia.com.

PCI-DSS and Card Storage

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We had an interesting discussion a few weeks back about storage in PCI-DSS. We disagreed with an acquirer’s position in how PCI-DSS views storage and therefore opened a whole can of … interesting debate.

The problem the acquirer had with our position was simple. We have a client who is currently doing a data migration import from another service provider to their document management system. Amongst the terabytes of data were possible scanned copies of credit card information, either in forms or actual card photo-copies themselves. Now, we are talking about terabytes.

Our position was fairly straightforward. Do you need these card data? We asked. No, said our client. We don’t need the card data as we do recon and backoffice operations on other form of identification. Can these information be removed or redacted? Bemused, they said, possibly, but the problem is that there are going to be millions of records to be dealt with.

Well, is there a way we can sanitize the data before it enters into your environment?

Yes, possibly, we need to ask the acquirer to ask their current provider to do it for us.

The provider you are taking business away from?

Yes.

Good luck…

And sure enough, the acquirer responded and asked us, “Shouldn’t PCI-DSS allow the storage of these card information, and how your client is able to deal with it? Why do you insist on us redacting and removing the card information? What then is the purpose of PCI-DSS??”

Now, on the surface, that argument does make sense. After all PCI-DSS applies to entities who store, transmit and process credit card information right? Why then wouldn’t we want our client to store credit card information if they are going through PCI-DSS?

Unfortunately, this is a case of getting the solution (PCI-DSS) mixed up with the problem(storing card data). In other words, in a more current analogy, just because I got vaccinated doesn’t mean I would purposely go out and try to get infected so that the vaccine has something to do. The purpose of PCI isn’t for you to store credit card. It’s for you to manage the storage of credit card IF you store it. Storing credit card isn’t a PCI-DSS objective, its an issue that PCI-DSS tries to solve.

So back to this little kerfuffle; if they pass us terabytes of information with card data, our client will need to figure a way to protect this data. Likely encryption of any information that card data is present, which includes key management etc. If they can redact it and remove it before it enters into our client’s environment, then we avoid it. We are basically following the concept of PCI-DSS :

Requirement 3 addresses protection of stored cardholder data. Merchants who do not store any cardholder data automatically provide stronger protection by having eliminated a key target for data thieves. Remember if you don’t need it, don’t store it!

PCI-DSS Prioritized approach

If we don’t need it, don’t store it. In this case, we don’t need it, so we are trying to escape storing it. However, if this cannot be done (which likely it won’t be), then we just need to put controls in there. We’re trying to get our clients to do less and we are also trying to remove card footprints in other areas, thus reducing the risks to the card brands, and likely save the world from impending disaster and destruction.

However, we do have another issue.

Because there is potentially CVV storage (photocopy of cards front and back) and scanned into softcopies, we have a bit of a problem. CVV cannot be stored in any format or in any media post authorisation. So therefore, if this is being dumped into our client’s environment, it’s imperative someone removes this information. To us, its a lot easier to remove it at source; but unfortunately that means there is an effort to be spent on it, which no one is willing to do.

How the CVV got stored in the first place is a question that we don’t have an answer to. However, we do know that if CVV is present, we cannot just encrypt it and be done with it. We will need to remove these information one by one. There are a few solutions out there that can do auto redaction and be applied to a massive amount of files, provided that the files are in a sort of standard fashion. That could be a solution on this, but again, it’s beyond what we are discussing for this article.

The point is, having PCI-DSS doesn’t automatically mean we MUST store card data. It simply means IF we store card data we are applying PCI-DSS controls to that storage of card data.

Let us know if you need more information about PCI-DSS or any IT standard compliance like ISO27001 or CSA/SOC, we are ready to assist, just contact us here. Stay safe everyone!

Hardening Checklist

Picture from https://guardiansafeandvault.com/

Requirement 2.2 has been often deliberated by customers undergoing PCI-DSS. To recap, the requirement states:

Develop configuration standards for all system components. Assure that these standards address all known security vulnerabilities and are consistent with industry-accepted system hardening standards.
Sources of industry-accepted system hardening standards may include, but are not limited to:
• Center for Internet Security (CIS)
• International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
• SysAdmin Audit Network Security (SANS) Institute
• National Institute of Standards Technology (NIST).

Requirement 2.2

So often, customers go ahead and download the CIS hardening documents at https://www.cisecurity.org/cis-benchmarks/ and copy lock stock and barrel into their policies and send it in. Now all this may be well and good, but now you have around 1,200 page tome with guidelines like 14 character alphanumeric password, as opposed to what PCI requires (7 Alphanumeric). This is where our customers get stuck, and some even send in a 1000 page hardening document to us to review, only for us to find that they have not implemented even 1% of what is noted in their hardening document.

After that, the hardening documents get re-jigged again until it meets a reasonable, practical standard that is implementable, usually in the form of a checklist. For a very quick hardening checklist, this is the initial one we often end up using, just to get our clients up to baseline speed, whether it’s PCI or not:

Hardening ItemServersNetwork DevicesDatabases
Assign individual server for each critical role (App, Web, DB, AD, AV, Patching etc)YNAY
Disable/Rename/Remove default user accountsYYY
Assign role based access to usersYYY
Disable insesure or unnecessary servicesYYNA
Use Secure Versions of Remote Access Services (SSH, RDP over SSL)YYY
Install well known Anti Virus with latest signaturesYNANA
Install latest OS / Firmware / Software security patchesYYY
Disable inactive users automatically after 90 daysYYY
Ensure Following Password Policies –
1. Use Complex Password with 7 characters or more
2. Remember minimum last 4 Passwords
3. Require passsword change within 90 days
4. Require password change upon password reset and first logon
YYY
Ensure following account policies –
1. Account lockout threshold – Max 6 attempts
2. Account lockdout duration – 30 mins or until admin unlocks
3. Idle Session Timeout – 15 Mins or less
YYY
Ensure passwords are stored securely with encryptionYYY
Enable Audit logging to Capture at minimum following events –
1. Successful Login
2. Failed Login
3. Administrative Actions
4. User Creation
5. User Deletion
6. User Updates
7. Escalation of Privileges
8. Access to Audit Trails
9. Initialization or stopping auditing
YYY
Configure NTP and time syncronizationYYY
Implement File Integrity Monitoring`YYY

Now obviously this doesn’t cover all the requirements of PCI (testing, scans, retention etc) but this should give us a fair idea of how ready our systems are for an audit or assessment.

If you have any queries on PCI or ISMS or any other security related standard, drop us a message at avantedge@pkfmalaysia.com.

Do or Do Not – ASV for SAQ A

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I would have thought this debate died out with the extinction of dinosaurs, but apparently, we are still at this subject in 2021. Still. Going. On.

So in the past weeks, there were some debate between us and some consultants as to whether the SAQ A requires an ASV scan or not. Our position was No. Their position was yes. So let’s look at it.

Now, keep in mind, we aren’t talking about best practice. We are talking about PCI-DSS v3.2.1 and what it says about ASV scans being mandatory for SAQ A. That’s it. That’s the statement. Now, debate.

There is actually no debate. This isn’t some sort of grey area, hard to explain, obscure rule in Sanskrit and written on the Sankara stones. This is just: Look at SAQ A, search for ASV, don’t find it. Thank you.

The ASV requirement is present in item 11.2.2 of PCI-DSS.

SAQ A does not have it.

So why do consultants still insist people do ASV scans for SAQ A?

There could be a lot of reasons, ranging from ‘guideline’, ‘best practice’ and so on. No doubt, having a scan (which isn’t expensive in any case) would be the least effort of security done by the merchant if they are hosting an e-commerce website that is redirecting customers to their payment processor once the “Click here to pay” is clicked. I mean, even if it has nothing to do with PCI, it may seem like common sense to have at least a scan done on your site to ensure it passes the very minimal requirement of security. So do we advocate an ASV scan to be done on any e-commerce site that deals with payment options (not necessarily payment data)? Yes, we do. There are many ways a site may get compromise. A coding error may allow data to be siphoned off, or passwords may be compromised. A re-direct may be vulnerable to man in the middle attacks; or even a total redirect to another page altogether where payment data is inadvertently entered. While the e-commerce site may be outsourcing the payment part to a processor, it still has the job of redirecting traffic to it.

Think of it as an usher (not the singer, but the job); where you enter into a dark auditorium, let’s say Royal Albert Hall to watch Ed Sheeran – and the usher takes you through this row of lights to what is supposedly your seat which you paid RM10,000 for.

When the lights come on, you find yourself in nice cosy room and in front of you someone who seemed to resemble Ed Sheeran but slightly off. His hair isn’t ginger and he isn’t as chubby as you see that guy on TV and he speaks with a slight Indian accent. And isn’t the Royal Albert Hall a HALL? Why are you in this room that resembles a glorified grandmother’s living room? You find out later that the usher had led you through the wrong Hall into a neighboring pub attached to the side of the hall and you are listening to the wonky music of Eddy Shiran.

The point is, the usher is pretty important in leading people to their seats. So as a redirect, even though you aren’t the main draw, you could end up leading your customers to Eddy Shiran instead.

But back to the main debate, whether it is required for SAQ A customers to go through ASV? No, it’s not.

However, there is always a but in everything. There are exceptions.

Some acquirers make it a point to state that they still require an ASV report even if merchants are going through SAQ A. That’s completely fine because the guidelines from Visa/Mastercard are just guidelines. At the end, the acquirer or payment brands may make individual decisions based on merchants, so it’s not written in stone. However, if there are no such requirement, we’re left to interpret the SAQ as it is, and it doesn’t state anything there.

Some may point out within the SAQ A under part 3a, there is a statement

ASV scans are being completed by the PCI SSC Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV Name)

Triumphantly being pointed out as proof of ASv requirement

Take note however, that above, under Part 3a, the instructions do state:

Signatory(s) confirms:
(Check all that apply)

the realisation that asv is still not needed for Saq A (or B)

Even under the title “PCI DSS Self-Assessment Completion Steps” of the SAQ:

Submit the SAQ and Attestation of Compliance (AOC), along with any other requested documentation—such as ASV scan reports—to your acquirer, payment brand, or other requester.

It does seem to be grappling at straws if this sentence was used to justify the requirement for PCI-DSS. “Such as” generally denotes an example, which may or may not exist or is required.

In previous requirements of merchants from Visa, there used to be statements describing merchant levels such as

 * Merchant levels are based on Visa USA definitions
** The PCI DSS requires that all merchants perform external network scanning to achieve compliance. Acquirers may require submission of scan reports and/or questionnaires by level 4 merchants

And perhaps there is where the myth was perpetuated from. In recent times Visa has updated its site (https://www.visa.com.my/support/small-business/security-compliance.html) to reflect a better understanding, stating:

“Conduct a quarterly network scan by an Approved Scan Vendor (“ASV”) (if applicable)”

In conclusion, SAQ A and B do not require ASV scans. If it’s required by the acquirer then so be it. If it’s supposed to be done out of best practice requirements, so be it. But you don’t want to hear an ASV/QSA telling you that you need to do something that is above and beyond your PCI requirement without them pointing to something in the standards that states so.

Finally – for SAQ B, which usually applies to POS terminals dialing up to the bank for authorisation; we’ve even seen some consultants requiring the merchant’s website to undergo ASV, which has nothing to do with their POS Terminals. Why ASV the website? Don’t know. So the merchants go about scanning their website that hasn’t been updated since 2012 and wonder, what sort of nonsensical requirement is this from PCI-DSS that needs them to pay just to scan something that is built by an 18 year old intern who had left the company 10 years ago? You don’t need to. So don’t do it.

Anyway, that’s it for now. Let us know your thoughts or questions and send to us at pcidss@pkfmalaysia.com and we will get back to you ASAP. Now, back to listening to our Spotify for Eddy Shiran!

PCI Delta Assessments

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Let’s start off by saying this isn’t a way for us to make light of the current situation by using the word ‘Delta’ here. We all know how dangerous and virulent the current strain of COVID is and this isn’t a matter of writing an article simply to get a search hit on that word.

That being said, this is a topic that seemed a bit obscure, even to us who have been doing PCI-DSS for more than a decade now.

So the question that can sometimes pop up would be: Great, we got our PCI-DSS certification now, everyone is celebrating and patting each other on the back. In 2 weeks time after our AoC/RoC has been produced, our product management rolls out a new Application XYZ which deals with credit card information along with a new environment, database, systems etc. Is this Application XYZ included in our current PCI-DSS certification or not?

It’s a good question. Because the fact is that many view PCI-DSS as a point in time audit, whereby the audit is done at a certain time and not over a period of time. One might argue that during the audit itself, sampling will be done over a 12 month period, therefore it cannot be categorised as a strictly point in time assessment. Regardless how you categorise it, at the end of the audit, there is the big result: a compliant AoC/RoC pair. Don’t get us started on the dreaded Certificate of Compliance or CoC, or CoC-n-Bull in our terms. Enough of that certificate nonsense. As for the AoC/RoC pair, the scope is stated clearly in it, defining the audit scope, the boundaries, the applications scoped in, locations etc. So this is great. When we get a new application onboard, we just add in that application into the AoC, right?

Right?

Unfortunately, at this point, the QSA will say, not really. Once the AoC is out, it’s out. Unless you want to re-do the audit or to recertify, then yes, that new application can be added in.

Now, we’ve faced such a situation before. And in fact PCI-DSS addresses it nicely at this wonderful piece of work: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_V2.0_Best_Practices_for_Maintaining_PCI_DSS_Compliance.pdf

In item 3.10.3 it states:

Any change to the network architecture or infrastructures directly related to or supporting the CDE should be reviewed prior to implementation. Examples of such changes include, but are not limited to, the deployment of new systems or applications, changes in system or network configurations, and changes in overall system topologies.

PCI reminding us to stay focus!

So in this case, application XYZ falls under new application. The point of PCI-DSS is that, just because you deploy a new thing or new firewall or new application doesn’t mean you are no longer compliant to PCI-DSS. After all, PCI encompass the practice and process as well, so the council understands and advice that these changes be implemented into the PCI program and PCI processes ensures that this stays compliant. So in short, if you have application XYZ coming in, make sure the PCI controls apply to it and it will then be reviewed under the next audit and included into the PCI AoC of the coming year. Let’s just update the current Aoc and we all go home now, right?

Right?

But wait, you aren’t listening, says the auditor, you still can’t update the current AoC. The AoC is already fixed for that year, unless you want to do an audit. Again. Like a month after you have done and dusted your recertification audit for that year.

In most cases, these changes for our clients go through the maintenance cycle without and issue and the following AoC simply gets updated to include it. But what if the customer insist on having the CURRENT AoC updated? This could be due to requirements from their client, regulatory or what not. How do we put that application into the current AoC without spinning off the whole audit all over again?

In short, you can’t. You either wait it out for the next year audit OR you re-do your certification audit and nullify the previous one. However, this is where that little obscurity comes in. Delta assessment.

Now I’ve heard of Delta assessment for PCI, but it’s almost invariably related to PA-DSS (SSF now), PCI PTS, P2PE where basically, vendors who had completed, let’s say their SSF, can validate low risk changes to their application and do a delta assessment. In PTS, the delta is done by the PTS Lab, but for SSF, the SLC vendor can basically do a self attestation. However, we don’t see any such item or recourse for PCI-DSS.

Discussing with the auditors, we find that indeed, there are possibilities of a delta assessment to be done, although rare, and not exactly cost effective, since whatever the delta is doing, it’s would just have a short lifespan before the changes get swallowed up by the main PCI program once the yearly audit cycle rolls in. That’s why we rarely see this done. But I rarely see a tapir doing a jig in a tutu, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist.

So what happens is that the auditor will formally audit this application and its environment and go through the certification process as would normally be done – except that this is limited to the application and systems. Once assessed, a formal delta AoC/Roc pair is released to supplement the existing AoC/RoC pair. And so that’s it, these supplement documents can then be shown together with the current AoC/Roc for verification purpose and in the next cycle, it’s consolidated back into the main RoC.

Now, this is fairly new to us. The logic of it is still beyond us somewhat because the whole point of PCI is for an environment to be able to handle changes and not have it audited everytime there is a significant change that occurs. Because every audit is costly and I’m sure every organisation has already got its hands full trying to sort out budgets during these times, without worrying about delta assessments.

The above is basically what we gather from discussions with auditor and not really from experience, because at the end, once the proposal was put out, our client thought better of it and decided not to pursue. So really, it’s still in the realms of theory and we may not be accurate in our assumptions. However, it’s still something interesting to keep in mind, though rare – like the tapir in tutu – it helps to know that this option does possibly exist.

Drop us a note at pcidss@pkfmalaysia.com and we will try to address all your concerns on PCI or other compliance matters like ISO27001, ISO20000 etc!

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